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China’s growth strategy as set out in the 11
th 5-year plan in 2005 called for upgrading of 
product quality, the development of an innovation society, and reduced reliance on foreign 
intellectual property with high license fees. Consistent with this policy, China has been 
involved in recent years with the development of a Chinese standard in third generation (3G) 
mobile phone technology, both in negotiating the standard and seeing it through to 
commercialization. This is the first case of a developing country both originating and 
successfully negotiating a telecommunications standard and this experience raises issues for 
China’s future development strategy based on product and process upgrading in 
manufacturing. We argue that while precedent setting from an international negotiating point 
of view, the experience has thus far is unproven commercially. But the lessons learned will 
benefit future related efforts in follow-on technologies if similar Chinese efforts are made. 
This paper documents Chinese standard-setting efforts from proposal submission to ITU to 
the current large-scale trial network deployment in China and overseas trial networks 
deployment. We discuss the underlying objectives for this initiative, evaluate its effectiveness, 
and assess its broader implications for Chinese development policy. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s growth strategy as set out in the 11
th 5-year plan in 2005 called for upgrading of 
product quality, the development of an innovation society, and reduced reliance on foreign 
intellectual property with high license fees. This policy is reflected in Chinese efforts in global 
standard setting for the third generation (3G) of a wireless telecommunications standard. China 
successfully negotiated the adoption of its own standard (TD-SCDMA) in the International 
Telecommunications Union in 2000, and Chinese enterprises have been engaged in its 
commercial development since. Most recently, the allocation of licenses has been announced. 
Here we both document and evaluate this experience. 
In the history of wireless technology development, only the EU, the United States, Japan 
and more recently South Korea have participated in standards setting activities. This is the first 
time that a non-OECD / developing country has participated in this firm concentrated and 
highly R&D-intensive area of activity. The Chinese third generation wireless standard (3G) is 
named TD-SCDMA (Time Division – Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access), and since 
its initial submission as a response to a call for proposal by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1997 it has received substantial support from the Chinese 
government in both negotiation and commercialization. More recently, after eight years of 
development, TD-SCDMA has moved on from a concept to a fledging industry. A large-scale 
trial network covering 10 Chinese cities is now under way and 28 more cities are planned to be 
covered. In overseas markets, a trial network is in service in South Korea and a commercial 
network has been put into use in Italy.   
China’s stated motives for entering this highly firm-concentrated and R&D intensive area  5
are to reduce the high license fees to foreign IPR holders, but also to put in place the basis for 
future standards development. Taking a broader view, this standard setting initiative is part of a 
growth strategy of creating an “innovative economy” covering education, R&D, and mega 
projects delineated in an important state directive The Guidelines on National Medium- and 
Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020. 
For China, the main challenge posed by this standard setting experience has come in 
finding successful commercialization. The appropriate commercialization strategy for the 
government to follow is unclear from literature. The TD-SCDMA standard has yet to receive 
wide deployment in either domestic or overseas markets. It has also been hard to follow other 
countries’ experience due to difference in technology capacity, market position and other 
factors. 
Another challenge has been the emergence of an alternative system which claims to be an 
advance on all the current major wireless systems including TD-SCDMA – the IP-based 
WiMAX system which has higher data rate transmission and lower costs with wider coverage 
per base station. A problem, therefore, is that even if the commercialization succeeds, it may 
soon be overtaken by WiMAX. Critics of WiMAX argue that it is poor in mobility which is 
supposedly an important feature of wireless mobile system. Nevertheless, WiMAX has already 
been deployed by Sprint and Clearwire in the US, and SK in Korea.   
Thus challenges remain for China in further commercialization and market deployment 
of the TD-SCDMA standard. But China’s commitment to its deployment, especially in the 
domestic market, is unwavering. They claim that the trial TD-SCDMA network covering 10 
cities is currently the largest network in the world, and with learning-by-doing the technology  6
is expected to improve further and has the potential to overtake the other two standards which 
are currently more advanced in technological maturity. In May 2008, Chinese government 
carried out the restructuring of telecommunications operators
2 which was widely thought to 
precede the final issuance of repeatedly postponed 3G licenses. Recently the Minister for 
Industry and Information Technology has announced how the third-generation (3G) mobile 
telecom licenses will be issued to Chinese operators at the beginning of 2009
3. 
In the sections that follow, we document Chinese participation both in the global 3G 
standards negotiation and the subsequent commercialization of China’s homegrown standard. 
This is followed by a brief exploration of its future given the competitive emergence of an 
alternative technology WiMAX. We then evaluate the likely success of this initiative in both 
the short and long term, stressing the challenges in commercialization beyond the negotiation 
of the standard.   
2. Chinese 3G Global Standards Negotiation 
We first discuss the successful negotiation of the Chinese 3G standard in the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2000, the first such standard negotiated by a developing 
country. The 3G negotiation was different from the standard setting experience in the first and 
second generations of wireless standards where nation or regional entities (i.e. the European 
Union) played a dominant role. The third generation was initiated and harmonized by ITU, a 
                                                        
2 On May 24th, 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance, PRC. jointly issued a statement of “Notification of Furthering Telecommunications 
Industry Reform” and announced a restructuring plan for the country’s telecom operators. According to the restructuring plan, 
the existing six Chinese operators will be changed into the pattern of "3+1″, with China Unicom's CDMA business 
incorporated into China Telecom to form a new China Telecom company, China Unicom's GSM network included into China 
Netcom to form a new China Unicom, China Tietong incorporated into China Mobile to form a new China Mobile company, 
and China Satcom remaining unchanged. 
3  See page 25 for details.  7
UN agency
4.  
The ITU follows a voting policy on its decisions of equal weight per country (i.e. each 
member country has one vote). In recent decades the ITU has shifted from an emphasis on 
spectrum allocation to one on standards setting which is reflected in increased amounts of 
money spent on the ITU—over a quarter of a billion U.S. dollars in 2003-2004 (Ryan, 2005). 
Ryan (2005) argues that the ITU’s legal authority in the international telecommunications 
area has been diluted by regional and sovereign interests to the point that it plays mostly a 
voluntary consensus-seeking function. The ITU lacks legal structure (it does not have a 
permanent charter), and it is possible for it to dissolve at any point if member countries no 
longer perceive value in the consensus-building approach that it offers. Thus the ITU must 
achieve consensus in standards negotiation; its standards must be found to be useful, and, in 
spite of its long standing existence, it must constantly demonstrate its value to its members to 
survive.  
The acceptance of the TD-SCDMA standard as one of the major 3G global standards by 
the ITU in 2000 was a great success for China. It is the only one successfully negotiated by a 
developing country in ITU
5. 
                                                        
4 As Ryan (2005) notes, the ITU was established in 1865 as an European organization from the outset. For more than fifty 
years, European powers controlled the ITU (originally called the International Telegraph Union), and its voting system 
favoured the largest European countries. After its involvement in World War II, the United States began to take a more active 
interest in participating in international telecommunications standardization efforts through the United Nations. However, the 
United States still viewed the ITU as a hindrance to the management of radio communications (through what it viewed as the 
ITU’s imposition of state-imposed policies versus its own laissez-faire policies and ideals). The United States only appointed 
temporary ambassadors to attend ITU radio conferences. In the 1980s, however, the ITU began to loosen its policies, which 
had favoured PTTs and similar government organizations. Although U.S. participation in the ITU is still tentative, the level of 
U.S. involvement has continued to gain momentum ever since. 
5  Suttmeier et al. (2006) note that “during the tenth five-year period (2001-2005), MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology) 
sponsored a series of “megaprojects” in conjunction with its “863” High-Technology Program. Among the megaprojects was a 
major initiative on standards titled “Key Technical Standards Project,” which included R&D support for WAPI, AVS, 3G 
telephony, optical networks, IP technologies, and other standards that have gained prominence. Reportedly, some 29 standards 
have resulted from this work, of which 13 have been submitted to ISO, IEC, or ITU for consideration”. So far, only 
TD-SCDMA has been accepted by the international Standard Setting Organizations.  8
The process leading to this outcome began in April 1997 when the ITU called for 
proposals for new Radio Transmission Technology (RTT) for IMT-2000 (the dubbed 3G 
standard) from around the world. Specifications for evaluation were also provided. This call 
reflected new emerging technology beyond the existing 2G standards adopted in wireless 
industry and the perceived need to codify and move forward with an agreed infrastructure 
standard. 
At the start, China only formed an evaluation team headed by Shumin Cao
6 and 
registered it with the ITU. But this facilitated China gaining knowledge of global standard 
setting mechanisms (e.g. In October, Shumin Cao attended an ETSI
7 conference with other 
Chinese representatives, the first time that Chinese representatives attended such an event).   
Later in 1998 the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT, the precursor of the 
now Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, MIIT) and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) jointly held a conference and solicited suggestions for a Chinese 3G 
candidate proposal. During the conference, Xu Guanghan, a senior consultant of Telecom 
Science and Technology Research Institute, made a presentation on the SCDMA standard and 
put forward the framework of TD-SCDMA. Among all the proposals, TD-SCDMA was 
selected to be the sole proposal of Chinese candidate for IMT-2000.   
Intensive work on drafting the standard followed. On 29 June 1998 – the last day set by 
the ITU for the submission of International Mobile Telecommunication 2000 (IMT-2000) 
standards – the China Academy of Telecom Technology (CATT), representing China as an 
                                                        
6  Shumin Cao was head of the China 3G evaluation team; Chair of Working Group 5 of Task Group 8/1 of ITU; also head of 
the first Chinese telecommunications standardization organization – China Wireless Telecommunication Standard (CWTS) – 
which was established in April, 1999 and joined 3GPP in 1999. 
7  ETSI stands for The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, a standard setting organization of EU.  9
ITU member, submitted the proposal to Geneva which was signed by the Minister and two 
Vice-Ministers of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). At the deadline for proposal 
submissions, the ITU had received 16 proposals from North America, Europe, Japan and China. 
Except for the TD-SCDMA proposal, all of the other proposals were from developed countries 
– the United States, European Union, Japan and South Korea. 
During the period of proposal evaluation that followed, a Chinese evaluation team played 
an active role in promoting TD-SCDMA. Suttmeier et al (2006) cite an unpublished Chinese 
standard strategy paper in 2004 which argued that the Chinese government recognized that 
special measures were necessary to enhance China’s effective participation in international 
standard-setting bodies. These included the development of expert teams who had the language 
ability, better knowledge of how international standardization bodies operate, and technical 
expertise to effectively represent China in these forums.   
The IMT-2000 conference initially had the objective of consolidating all the submitted 
CDMA-based proposals into a single standard, and the submitted TDD proposals into another 
standard. This objective changed, however, as work progressed. Its final recommendation (ITU 
2000a) was for five different radio interfaces to be adopted for terrestrial IMT-2000 services: 
The first was equivalent to the Euro-Japanese Wideband CDMA solution, the second was the 
U.S. CDMA2000 solution, the third was the Euro-China TDMA/CDMA hybrid (TD-SCDMA), 
the fourth was the evolution of D-AMPS and GSM to EDGE
8, and the fifth was ETSI’s DECT
9. 
                                                        
8 EDGE (Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution) is an extension on top of 2G standards – GSM and D-AMPS. Though 
recognized part of ITU's 3G definition, EDGE is most frequently referred to as 2.75G. Its potential for further upgrading is 
limited compared to the first three.   
9 DECT or Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (formerly Digital European Cordless Telephone) is an ETSI 
standard for digital portable phones (cordless home telephones), commonly used for domestic or corporate purposes. DECT 
can also be used for wireless broadband data transfers. DECT is recognized by the ITU as fulfilling the IMT-2000 requirements 
and thus qualifies as a 3G system.  10
The first three of these were effectively 3G standards. 
China had pursued other similar special measures in other standard setting efforts such as 
WAPI, but had not succeeded in gaining acceptance of their standards by international 
Standard-Setting Organizations (SSOs). One of the elements explaining TD-SCDMA’s success 
was Siemens’ support for TD-SCDMA as a joint partner of this technology
10 and China’s 
maneuvering in the negotiation as a third standard to be adopted alongside the EU-backed and 
USA-backed standards. However, whether the TD-SCDMA negotiation success represents an 
isolated event or whether it reflects a negotiating strategy that can also be used in the future is 
still unclear. 
After a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standardization body was established 
in 1998, 3GPP took on the task of detailed drafting of standards
11，ITU shifted towards setting 
global frameworks for requirements, spectrum allocations, interworking, and other matters. On 
16 March 2001 at the 11
th plenary session of the 3GPP, all technical specifications of the 
TD-SCDMA standard were accepted by 3GPP and were included in 3GPP’s Release 4
12. 
Though it was claimed by Chinese press to be a breakthrough indicating that TD-SCDMA had 
been accepted not only by the ITU but also by an industry alliance of operators and vendors, its 
concrete impact awaited its commercialization. 
 
                                                        
10 In order to promote a uniform standard WCDMA in Europe, the Siemens proposed TD-CDMA was abandoned, which led 
Siemens to switch their support to the Chinese TD-SCDMA. 
11  3GPP is dominated by ETSI - an EU standards setting organization –and only develops the 3G standards that are based on 
the UTRA related proposals. Therefore a sister project named Third Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2) was established 
in January 1999 to facilitate the development of 3G standards for the cdma2000 related proposals. 
12 3GPP standards are structured as Releases, discussion of 3GPP thus frequently refers to the functionality in one release or 
another. Release 4 originally called the Release 2000 which added features including an all-IP Core Network.  11
3. TD-SCDMA Commercialization 
The commercialization of the Chinese 3G standard has proved to be challenging. The 
issues with commercializing the Chinese TD-SCDMA standard have been competition from 
parallel standards and new emerging technologies such as WCDMA, CDMA2000 and WiMAX 
financing, technology development, and finding qualified labor. These all which go beyond the 
process involved in the initial international standard negotiation. But these issues were already 
becoming evident at the time negotiation was completed. At the time CATT (China Academy 
of Telecom Technology) submitted the Chinese proposal to ITU, China’s leading 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers such as Huawei and ZTE were only producing 
SPC exchanges, and had little experience in producing other wireless telecommunications 
equipment. By comparison, the other two IMT-2000 standards adopted had already been 
worked on for over ten years and equipment was available
13.  
Technology Leading to TD-SCDMA 
TD-SCDMA derives from SCDMA, an indigenous wireless access technology, developed 
by Beijing Xinwei Telecom Technology Inc, a joint venture of CATT (China Academy of 
Telecom Technology) and Cwill (standing for Chinese Wireless Local loop, founded by two 
Chinese working in the United States) founded in 1995. As a government agency, CATT has 
received RMB 15 million from the National Key Technologies R&D Program under the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and RMB 10 million from the State Planning 
Committee (precedent of National Development and Reform Commission) for SCDMA 
                                                        
13 The ITU had been developing IMT-2000 since 1985,, previously termed Future Public Land Mobile Telephone System 
(FPLMTS). In ETSI, the European standardization body, UMTS standardization started in 1990 when a sub technical 
committee SMG5 was established.  12
development
14. Cwill mainly provided technology. In 1998, SCDMA successfully passed a 
state-level pilot network test, which not only helped its subsequent deployment
15 but  also  won 
support from Chinese government for the technology embedded in the new standard– 
TD-SCDMA. 
Datang Telecom / Datang Mobile and Early Commercialization Activity 
The commercialization of the TD-SCDMA standard has centrally involved Datang 
Technology Co. Ltd., an enterprise associated with the Ministry of Information Industry at that 
time. Originally, development of the standard was taken up by Xin Wei, a joint venture of 
Datang Telecom Technology Co., Ltd. and Cwill. But at the end of 1999, when TD-SCDMA 
became a possible standard likely to be accepted by the ITU and with commercialization on the 
agenda, a difference of opinion occurred between Datang and Xin Wei over the likelihood of 
successful commercialization. Finally the decision was taken to transfer TD-SCDMA 
development to Datang.   
Datang had another ally in commercializing TD-SCDMA – Siemens, and the proposed 
standard was based on a combination of technologies from Datang and Siemens. Their 
cooperation started in 1998 and focused on the development of TSM, an interim format 
bridging from the earlier 2G standard GSM to TD-SCDMA. Between 1998 and 2003, Siemens 
invested US$ 70million in TD-SCDMA development
16 and set up joint laboratories with 
Datang in Beijing, Munich, Berlin, Milan, Vienna and London. At one point, over 500 Siemens 
                                                        
14  See Nan Qiao, Yixuan Lu, TD-SCDMA Legend, http://www.cww.net.cn/zhuanti/td_scdma/default.html. 
15 The indigenous nature of SCDMA also helped in it gaining government support. For example, in January, 2004, MII 
released a Notice for Trial Deployment of Telecommunication Infrastructure in Selected Suburban Areas, in which it stipulated 
that SCDMA be the only suggested wireless access system. http://www.mii.gov.cn/art/2005/12/29/art_992_4083_1.html 
16  Managing Director of Siemens’ Mobile Network provided this data in a press conference, 
http://www.c-fol.net/news/content/12/20030901092516.htm   13
researchers were working in China. However, in view of the rapid development of rival 
technologies, Datang decided to move to a new LCR (Low Chip Rate) format which is in 
hindsight proved to be the right decision. However, this change was resisted by Siemens and 
led to the breakup of their partnership in 2003. Soon afterwards, on August 29
th, 2003, Siemens 
and Huawei announced the creation of a new joint venture between them with a joint 
investment of US$ 100million focusing on TD-SCDMA development in which Siemens owned 
51% of the equity. 
Datang also began a restructuring during the commercialization of TD-SCDMA. In 2002, 
to speed up commercialization, Datang Mobile was spun off from Datang Telecom Technology 
Co. specifically to focus on this task. Its research team is comprised of three parts, one was its 
mother company in Beijing, i.e. those who had been conducting TD-SCDMA development, 
another one was from Shanghai which had engaged in GSM development, the other one was 
from Xi’an which had been involved in WCDMA development. By the first half of 2003, the 
whole research team comprised 130 researchers. 
Since its establishment, Datang Mobile has faced the challenge of shortage of financial 
resources for commercial development
17. According to 21
st Century Economy Report (2007), 
the funds required by Datang Mobile for regular operations were approximately RMB 
400million (about US$ 50million) annually. Their gap between expenditures and income was 
around RMB 200million (US$ 25million) each year, and so subsidies and policy loans to 
Datang Moible become an important source of funding. It also noted that in 2003, Datang 
                                                        
17 A complex system like a wireless standard development requires substantial investment. GSM was mainly promoted by 
operators, and manufacturers only started to invest in the development of GSM after 10 operators promised to purchase their 
products. As a manufacturing company, Qualcomm gained wide support from American government, operators and cooperated 
with South Korea in the rollout of the first CDMA network.    14
Mobile got over RMB 200 million (about US$ 25 million) from MII and NDRC in form of 
special funds. After that, loans of RMB 200-300 million had been provided annually. Again in 
2007, to facilitate equipment manufacturing, the China Development Bank provided a 15-year 
interest free loan of RMB 4.6 billion (about US$ 580 million) to Datang Mobile which took the 
form of a TD-SCDMA Olympic and Commercialization Network Engineering Construction 
project
18. 
In addition, Datang Mobile’s shareholding company – Datang Telecom Technology Co. – 
also received financial support from various banks at later stages of TD-SCDMA 
commercialization. For example, in 2007, Datang Telecom Technology Co. received RMB 
30billion (about US$ 4billion) from the China Development Bank of which the interest rate 
involved was about two thirds of the commercial interest rate
19. 
Spectrum Allocation 
The commercialization of the TD-SCDMA standard has also been integrally involved 
with spectrum allocation. This has yet to be finalized as licenses are yet to be issued, but the 
decisions made in this area will influence the success of the commercialization. 
At the beginning of TD-SCDMA commercialization, few operators or manufacturers 
except Datang were interested in this area. Even domestic wireless manufacturers, such as 
Huawei and ZET who had invested in WCDMA and CDMA2000, did not carry out any R&D 
on TD-SCDMA. To improve market confidence, MII released a 3G spectrum allocation plan 
on October 23
rd, 2002, 155MHz for TD-SCDMA (a core spectrum range of 55M 
[1880~1920M, 2010~2025M] plus an extra spectrum range of 100M [2300~2400M]), 60MHz 
                                                        
18  See “4.6 Billion RMB of Interest-free Loan Finalized, Datang Mobile’s Fund Demand 3 Billion RMB This Year”, 21st 
Century Economy Report, April 26
th, 2007, website: http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2007-04-26/09181484475.shtml. 
19  The Finance and Economy Times (Cai Jing Shi Bao). See http://www.cww.net.cn/article/html/2007/6/297/66244.htm   15
for WCDMA and 60MHz for CDMA2000 which are both in the core spectrum range assigned 
by ITU for IMT-2000.   
Currently, TD-SCDMA technology only uses the core spectrum range of 55M. The extra 
100MHz assigned is thought to be advantageous for the global deployment of TD-SCDMA 
because this range is not used by WCDMA and CDMA2000. This means that the TD-SCDMA 
standard can be a complementary extension network when operators face spectrum shortage. 
An outcome of the spectrum allocation favoring TD-SCDMA deployment in the future was 
that Siemens announced a follow-up investment of €50 million for the development of 
TD-SCDMA the following day of the 3G spectrum allocation announcement
20. 
Spectrum was assigned free to operators in China during the 1G and 2G deployment, but 
as a scarce resource, it had been allocated by auction in most of the OECD countries. In the 3G 
spectrum allocation, auction was again widely adopted in the EU, which contributed large 
revenue to the governments, especially in EU (see Table 13). However, in the countrieswhere  
the 3G market did not develop as quickly as in the 2G era, auction license fees became a 
financial burden for operators. Some argued that there had been extensive overbidding and 
miscalculation of the licenses’ value. Several firms handed back their 3G licenses or postponed 
the setting up of their 3G infrastructure, completely writing off the license fee in their accounts 
(Gruber, 2005). In the second half of 2006, the 3G market in Europe started to grow, and 
whether auction prices were reasonable or not from a long-term point of view is now an open 
question. For now, however, in light of the European experience the Chinese government 
would adopt spectrum auctions in the 3G deployment. This will facilitate commercialization of 
                                                        
20  Nan Qiao, Yixuan Lu,“ TD-SCDMA Legend” http://www.cww.net.cn/zhuanti/td_scdma/default.html   16
the TD-SCDMA standard, but at a cost to the Chinese government of revenues. 
Table 13      3G Mobile licensing in selected countries 




Method Date  awarded  Total 
amount paid (US$ million) 
Austria 6  4  Auction  November  2000  618 
Belgium 4  3  Auction  March  2001  421.2 
Denmark  4  3  Sealed bid auction  September 2001  472 
Finland 4  3  Beauty  contest March  1999  Nominal 
France  4  3  Beauty contest + fee  July 2001  553 each, plus 1% of revenue   
Germany 6  4  Auction  August  2000  46,140 
Greece 3  3  Hybrid  July  2001  414 
Italy 5 4 Hybrid  October  2000  10,180 
Netherlands 5  5  Auction  July  2000  500 
Norway  4  2  Beauty contest + fee  November 2000  88 
Spain  4  3  Beauty contest + fee  March 2000  480 
Sweden  4  3  Beauty contest  December 2000  Nominal 
Switzerland 4  2  Auction  December  2000  119.8 
UK 5  4  Auction  April  2000  35,400 
Sources: Johannes Bauer and Yu-Chieh Lin (2004) 
TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance 
Another element in the commercialization of the TD-SCDMA standard has been the 
TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance. In view of the complexity and difficulties of TD-SCDMA 
commercialization, and also partly due to the breakdown in cooperation between Datang 
Mobile and Siemens, under the call of three Chinese government agencies – MII, NDRC and 
MOST, an industry alliance for TD-SCDMA was established in October 2002, with eight 
Chinese manufacturers as the initiators including the four leaders in Chinese 
telecommunications infrastructure equipment manufacturing industry, Datang Mobile, Huawei, 
ZTE and Potevio. In 2003, six more domestic companies joined. Four of them were chip 
developers who aimed to rapidly improve chip design and manufacturing capacity which had 
also been a weak link in the Chinese wireless industry chain.   
The alliance also received public subsidies from the government. For example, in 2004,  17
MII, NDRC and MOST jointly set up the TD-SCDMA R&D and Industrialization Project 
investing RMB 768million (about US$ 100million) to support the TD-SCDMA Industry 
Alliance
21.  
As in the case of other technologies such as WAPI (WLAN Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure), the TD-SCDMA alliance intended to gain support from foreign companies by 
encouraging them to partner with Chinese domestic manufacturers. This was expected to speed 
up the development of TD-SCDMA, and also to facilitate the acceptance of TD-SCDMA 
products by the world market. In turn, foreign companies were also to gain profile in the 
Chinese market. 
In the infrastructure equipment manufacturing sector, four partnering organizations 
involving Chinese companies and leading foreign firms have been established. They are 
Datang Mobile and Alcatel (Alcatel received 3% ownership of Datang Mobile for RMB 
300million, with additional RMB 100million for R&D in antenna development), Huawei and 
Siemens (they created a joint venture called TD Tech Ltd. in which Siemens has 51% 
ownership), ZTE and Ericsson (they reached a strategic cooperative agreement), and Potevio 
and Nokia (they created a joint venture in October 2005 in which Potevio has 51% ownership).   
In the terminal sector, chip development has been a weak link for Chinese terminal 
manufacturing. To strengthen this link, three state enterprises – T3G, Commit and Datang were 
established during 2002 and 2003. T3G was established by Philips (in 2006, Philips 
Semiconductors was spun off from Royal Philips and became NXP), Datang Mobile and 
Samsung in January 2003. Motorola later joined as a new shareholder in 2005. Commit was 
                                                        
21 See  http://it.sohu.com/20070703/n250884236.shtml.   18
established in 2002 by 17 leading domestic and foreign manufacturers, including Potevio, the 
CATT (China Academy of Telecom Technology), Texas Instruments (China), Nokia (China) 
Investment Co. Limited and LG Electronics, Inc. Commit later went bankrupt due to a shortage 
of funding in the first half of 2008.   
Another related chip development company is Spectrum Communications, established by 
overseas Chinese Ping Wu in Silicon Valley in April 2001. This company has grown rapidly 
over the past few years, and now has R&D centers and branch offices both in the U.S. (Silicon 
Valley, San Diego) and in China (Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen). In 2003, it successfully 
developed the SC6600B, the world's first GSM/GPRS (2.5G) baseband chip with integrated 
multimedia and power management functions. A year later, it developed the SC8800A, the 
world's first single chip dual-mode TD-SCDMA/GSM baseband chip. After that, a series of 
upgraded chips were developed before February 2007. 8 versions were released, the latest one 
being SC8800H, a single chip solution which supports HSDPA/TD-SCDMA/GSM/GPRS/EDGE. 
As stated on Spreadtrum's homepage, its products support a broad range of wireless 
communications standards, including GSM, GPRS, EDGE, TD-SCDMA, W-CDMA, HSDPA, 
HSUPA, as well as future standards of wireless communication. Its financial operations have 
also been successful. In June 2007, it completed an initial public offering and listing on 
NASDAQ stock market exchange. In January 2008, it acquired US-based RFIC design 
company - Quorum Systems, Inc. According to a Merrill Lynch report released in October, 
2006, Spreadtrum had 10% of China GSM/GPRS market
22. These developments implied both 
that access to the TD-SCDMA standard could grow through these chip developments and also 
                                                        
22 The other major competitors on China market are MTK (40%), TI (23%), ADI (10%), Philips (6%), Agere (4%), Inflieon 
(3%), in brackets are their market shares. See http://www.eefocus.com/html/06-12/120_1166415091.shtml.  19
that competitive technologies were also more widely available. 
Recently, China Mobile joined this alliance in July, 2008, being the first operator member 
of this alliance. China Mobile is the best performing telecommunications operator in China, its 
participation is expected to have influential impact on the TD-SCDMA commercialization. 
So far, leveraging Chinese government’s support, the TD-SCDMA alliance has covered 
the whole industry chain including operating, manufacturing (e.g., chipset, platform software, 
handset, antenna, infrastructure equipment and testing instruments) and sales channeling. 
Currently, the alliance has 58 members, providing technologies over the whole industry chain 
of TD-SCDMA system which includes (Appendix A shows the first 40 members as of 2006). 
TD-SCDMA Forum 
A further related element of the commercialization of TD-SCDMA has been the 
TD-SCDMA Forum. Similar to other promoting bodies of wireless systems such as GSM 
Association (GSMA) and CDMA Development Group (CDG)
23, TD-SCDMA Forum was 
established to promote the technology after it was approved by ITU as one of IMT-2000 
standards. These organizations include both manufacturers and operators from all over the 
world and aim to provide a platform for all stakeholders to communicate and coordinate. 
Among the co-founders of the Forum were China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, 
Datang, Huawei, Motorola, Nortel and Siemens. The Forum was accepted by the 3GPP (3
rd 
Generation Partnership Project) as its MRP (Market Representative Partner) in 2005. The 
Forum also signed partnership agreements with major international telecom organizations, such 
as GSMA and CDG. The Forum now has over 300 members from more than 30 countries, 
                                                        
23  GSMA was committed to promoting GSM and WCDMA which are both dominantly sponsored by EU telecommunications 
standard setting organization, ETSI. CDG was established to promote CDMA and the evolved 3G version, CDMA 2000.  20
covering all sectors of the value chain, namely standardization agents, operators, vendors, 
content providers, financial and investment organizations and research institutions. 
However, compared with the GSMA and CDG bodies, its global impact is still small. For 
example, the GSMA was founded in 1987 by 15 operators committed to the joint development 
of a cross border digital system for mobile communications. Now it is a global trade 
association representing more than 740 GSM mobile Operator Members across 219 countries 
and territories around the world. In addition, over 210 Associate Members (manufacturers and 
suppliers) support the Association’s Initiatives as key partners (GSM Association Brochure 
2008).  
The CDMA Development Group (CDG), founded in December 1993, is an international 
consortium of companies who have joined together to speed the adoption and evolution of 3G 
CDMA wireless systems around the world. The CDG comprises of CDMA service providers 
and manufacturers, application developers and content providers. Currently it has 108 members, 
including 42 Cellular, PCS and WLL Operators Members, 14 Subscriber Unit Vendors, 5 Test 
Equipment Vendors, 17 Other Telecommunications Companies, 17 Network Equipment 
Vendors, 9 Application Developers, 3 Reciprocal Members and 1 Affiliate Member (CDMA 
Development Group official website). 
Tests and National Standard Entitlement 
No other wireless standard has undergone as many tests as TD-SCDMA in its 
commercialization. To speed up the development and maturation of the TD-SCDMA standard, 
under the government support, manufacturers and operators have conducted a series of 
laboratory and fields tests.    21
These tests have helped uncover problems with the TD-SCDMA technology. For example, 
China Daily reported in mid-2005 that during the terminal laboratory test period, the result of 
a series of tests showed that the TD-SCDMA terminal performance was not satisfactory due 
to poor chip function, and interoperability was also not up to expectations. After further tests, 
in September 2005 MII released test results for TD-SCDMA, claiming that the Project has 
achieved remarkable breakthroughs proving the feasibility of an independent TD-SCDMA 
network deployment. With the initial success of the laboratory tests, on January 20
th 2006, 
TD-SCDMA was announced to be the national standard for China’s wireless 
telecommunications industry. The other two standards were announced to be industry 
standards half a year later.   
After the laboratory tests, more field tests were then carried out. In December 2005, an 
“Application Demo Network Experiment” was initiated aiming to test the field performance 
of TD-SCDMA terminals. Six Chinese operators participated in this test. In February 2006, a 
“TD-SCDMA Scale Network Technology Application Experiment” was initiated under the 
joint guidance of NDRC, MOST and MII to test the field performance of the TD-SCDMA 
application in the presence of large traffic load and intensive coverage. It covered Beijing, 
Shanghai, Qingdao, Xiamen and Baoding. China Telecom, Chine Netcom and China Mobile 
constructed test networks in Shanghai/Baoding, Beijing/Qingdao and Xiamen respectively. In 
mid-November, the tests reached a “user friendly” stage during which thousands of users 
were invited to test the network performance. Costs for these tests were fully covered by the 
Chinese government.   
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TD-SCDMA Large-Scale Commercialization Trial Network 
A large-scale TD-SCDMA commercialization trial network deployment began with China 
Mobile’s tender invitation in April 2007. This covered 8 cities. China Telecom and China 
Netcom also took their deployment to 2 other cities (see Appendix B). 
China Mobile finalized its selection of infrastructure vendors for the rollout of its 
TD-SCDMA test network in eight cities under a tender amounting to RMB 26.7 billion. 
According to Ovum and Jean-Charles Doineau (2007), ZTE was to win about 45.5% of the 
tender. Ericsson, which is the OEM for ZTE’s technology, were to be granted 1.2% of the total 
contract. Following ZTE, Datang was to win about 27.5% of the contract. Alcatel-Lucent, 
through its Alcatel Shanghai Bell subsidiary as a partner of Datang was to own a subset of this 
contract. Potevio was granted 2.7%. Finally TD Tech (a joint venture between Huawei and 
Seimens) won about 13.8% of the contract
24. In sum, the major winners were those who had 
invested substantially in the R&D and subsequently gained better performance in the previous 
TD-SCDMA network tests.   
Meanwhile, China Mobile began testing more than 20 types of TD-SCDMA-compliant 
handsets in eight cities in China. The result of the testing helped China Mobile come to the 
company’s procurement decisions for later terminal tender. Units being tested include those 
from ZTE, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, which passed initial tests covering core 
technologies. In December 2007, China Mobile announced its plan to purchase 30,000 – 
40,000 TD-SCDMA-based 3G phones via public bidding to begin tests on the third generation 
network. China Mobile finally purchased 60,000 TD-SCDMA mobile phones, more than its 
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original plan. The tender winners were New Postcom
25 (21,000), Lenovo (10,500), Hisense 
(10,500), ZTE (9,000), Samsung (4,500) and LG (4,500). Spreadtrum became the chip supplier 
to New Postcom and Lenovo, MTK to Hisense and ZTE, T3G to Samsung. A second round of 
terminal tender followed right afterwards and was won by Huawei, Yulong, Huali and Panda. 
Spreadtrum, Datang and T3G were the main chip suppliers again. 
Infrastructure network construction was largely finished by January 2008. On April 1
st, 
2008, China Mobile initiated commercial service based on the TD-SCDMA trial network in 8 
cities. Voice traffic service charges are lower than current service and there are some subsidies 
to handset purchaser. Also the new feature of video phone service is added. The current trial 
network can accommodate 8 million customers, almost 95% of the current GPRS customers in 
China, the largest 3G network in the world. China Mobile CEO, Wang Jianzhou, clarified that 
the first round investment totaled RMB 15billion (over US$ 2billion). China Netcom and 
China Unicom had also set up a TD-SCDMA network in another two cities which was taken 
over by China Mobile later. 
According to ChinaTechNews.com released on August 21, 2008
26, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology of China has announced its approval of China Mobile's 
nationwide commercial trial network based on TD-SCDMA technology. The approval 
notification says that network construction of TD-SCDMA should be accelerated and a specific 
plan should be made to ensure smooth progress of the construction. It requires China Mobile to 
do careful research and produce a follow-up network development plan to promote the 
                                                        
25 New Postcom is a private telecommunications company established in 2005. Based on OEM contract, it has formed 
strategic partnership with Datang. In the tender of the wireless infrastructure equipment initiated by China Mobile, New 
Postcom won 5.61%. In this terminal tender, it won about 35%, as a new enterprise, this achievement is really impressive and 
surprising. 
26 http://www.chinatechnews.com/2008/08/21/7313-china-mobile-will-start-nationwide-td-scdma-commercial-trial-in-china/  24
industrialization of TD-SCDMA. At the same time, the company should contact and 
communicate with the relevant equipment suppliers, terminal channel suppliers and users to 
jointly promote the growth of the TD-SCDMA industry chain. The approval also provides an 
overview of the frequency of the TD-SCDMA network, the number field and the development 
of terminals.   
Recently, China Mobile announced that the coverage of the TD-SCDMA trial would 
expand by another 28 cities, totaling 38 cities which demonstrates higher data service demand 
in a survey conducted by China Mobile
27. The second round network construction plan features 
the compatibility with 2G network (GSM) and shared core network which can be used in 2G 
(i.e., GSM), 3G (i.e., TD-SCDMA and its evolved versions such as HSDPA), and even 
TD-LTE (i.e. 4G version of TD-SCDMA).   
Currently, the deployed network infrastructure has been upgraded to a high-speed 
downlink packet access (HSDPA) – an enhanced version. Datang Mobile is working toward an 
evolution of TD-SCDMA that will eventually incorporate LTE (Long-Term Evolution)
28. 
Overseas Exploration 
Although the test network deployment is in China, a first overseas test network was also 
established in South Korea. In April 2007, a TD-SCDMA trial network costing US$ 58million 
entered service in South Korea. This network was jointly constructed by Datang, ZTE (base 
station) and Samsung (core network). SK Telecom also announced their intention of investing 
equivalent to around RMB 50million in R&D for TD-SCDMA. This initial success in overseas 
                                                        
27 http://www.cww.net.cn/news/html/2008/8/28/2008828934332452.htm 
28  http://electronics.ihs.com/news/2008/abi-tdscdma-china.htm. Also for details about evolution of TD-SCDMA, please see the 
section.   25
market testing reflects previous cooperation between the two countries in telecommunication 
technology development. More importantly, it also implies further cooperation possibilities 
between the two. As South Korea is advanced in 3G applications, its cooperation will provide a 
good test environment for TD-SCDMA and subsequently the two parties can both make further 
progress
29.  
The first commercial TD-SCDMA network in Europe, an outcome of the cooperation 
between POTEVIO and Italian MYWAVE, was put into use on September 23, 2008
30. In 
previous July, POTEVIO and MYWAVE jointly announced the construction of a TD-SCDMA 
trial network. On July 18
th, 2008, the two companies signed a cooperating agreement and the 
construction began on September 1
st, 2008. As the first commercial TD-SCDMA network in 
Europe, the net had been put into use on September 12
th, providing R4 and HSDPA service. 
According to TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance, the two companies are carrying out negotiation 
for the next network construction. POTEVIO said it would offer the updated products for 
MYWAVE and further its cooperation with other foreign carriers to ship TD-SCDMA into 
Europe. 
Licensing 
Chinese 3G licensing has been postponed repeatedly due to uncertainty over the maturity 
of the new Chinese standard and potential industry restructuring to occur along with the 
licensing process. With the onset of the recent financial crisis in November 2008, the Chinese 
government announced an economic stimulus plan which included telecommunications 
investment. In this context, the Minister for Industry and Information Technology announced 
                                                        
29  Some reports stated that small-scale TD-SCDMA test networks have also been constructed in France and Romania.  
30 TD-SCDMA  Industry  Alliance  announced “POTEVIO Set up The First Commercial TD-SCDMA Network in Europe” 
<http://www.tdscdma-alliance.org/english/news/list.asp?id=4440>.  26
on December 12, 2008 that third-generation (3G) mobile telecom licenses were to be issued to 
Chinese operators at the beginning of 2009. China Mobile will receive a license for 
TD-SCDMA, China Unicom and China Telecom will receive licenses for WCDMA and 
CDMA2000 respectively. To avoid duplication in the infrastructure investment, the Minister 
emphasized the necessity of agreement between the operators on infrastructure sharing before 
licensing
31. 
4. Evaluation of China’s 3G Experience 
Evaluating the success of China’s efforts at TD-SCDMA standards negotiation and 
subsequent commercialization and the lessons it offers for similar further efforts is difficult 
since at this stage commercialization remains in progress. It seems fair to say that this process 
has been slower than at first thought, but it is still possible that major financial rewards will 
result. It is too early to tell. As we mention in our introduction, China’s motives for engaging in 
this highly firm-concentrated and R&D intensive area are to reduce license fees paid to foreign 
IPR holders; to set the basis for standards development; and more broadly, to integrate the 
standard setting initiatives into the state strategy of creating an “innovative economy”. And 
even if for now commercialization is largely restricted to the Chinese market the first of these 
objectives will likely be met. 
License Fee Reduction 
It is still too early to assess the benefits of license fee reduction from TD-SCDMA. One 
can claim that even if restricted to the Chinese market, a 3G Chinese standard sharply reducing 
                                                        
31 See “China to Award 3G Licenses in Early 2009”, China Economic Review, December 15, 2008. The move is expected to 
generate US$29.1 billion in investments from the three operators. According to telecom consultancy BDA China, the operators 
have already budgeted for US$43.4 billion in 3G-related capital expenditure, including projects completed this year or planned 
for completion over the next three years.  27
foreign royalties will pay for itself. But Kennedy (2006) claims that Chinese government has 
drafted two dozen industry and national standards in information technology (including 
TD-SCDMA), but the gains from these to China have been small. Chinese industry has not 
collected significant royalties from these standards, cross licensing of standards between 
Chinese and foreign companies has yet to occur, foreign firms have not turned over their 
intellectual property as a result of these standards, and products based upon these standards 
have met with only limited commercial success.  
Not unusual for standard setting initiatives, a well-defined licensing mechanism has not 
yet been established for TD-SCDMA. Some Standard-Setting Organizations (SSOs) require a 
member whose proprietary technology is included in the standard to license that technology to 
other members of the SSO either free of charge or on “fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory 
(FRND)” terms. But the definition of FRND is unclear. Some of the key companies involved 
have rejected the idea of licensing on FRND terms. For example, Qualcomm overtly only 
negotiates with other companies on a one-to-one basis. As an outcome of its aggressive IPR 
policy, Qualcomm has gained a substantial amount of revenue from licensing. Table 15 shows 
that Qualcomm’s licensing and royalty fees account for approximately 30% of its total 
revenues and about twice its R&D expenses. 
Table 15      Qualcomm’s Patent Revenue and Other Selected Financial Items (US$ million) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Revenues  2920    3847 4880 5673 7526 8871 
-- Licensing and royalty fees  835  985  1366  1929  2750  3106 
  -- Equipment and Services  2086  2862  3514  3744  4776  5765 
Research and development  440  523  720  1011  1538  1829 
Net income  360  827  1720    2143  2470  3303 
Source: Qualcomm Co. annual reports.  28
In the still short history of standard setting competition in the wireless 
telecommunications industry since 1980s, a series of disputes have occurred between different 
standard sponsors and not unusually, political power is involved in the resolution. For example, 
during the development of GSM standard, according to a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) released in 1987 by a large group of European telecoms operators, GSM was to become 
an open, non-proprietary standard with open interface requiring IPR coordination
32. But 
Motorola, as the owner of nearly sixty of the 130 patents involved in GSM at that time, refused 
to cooperate in cross-licensing. Instead it chose to engage in cross-licensing only with leading 
companies that also had valuable patent licenses to offer in return. EU PTTs then announced 
that no contract would be granted to those who refused to cooperate in cross-licensing (Gessler, 
2002). 
In the 1990s, a well-known example of cross-licensing is between Qualcomm and 
Ericsson. Nokia. Qualcomm stated it was willing to grant licenses for CDMA2000, but not for 
the other CDMA proposals unless some conditions were met. Ericsson stated that they were 
prepared to grant licenses to any standard, provided that all essential IPRs pertaining to the 
standards would be licensed reciprocally, i.e. no other company would refuse to license their 
IPR (Gessler, 2002)
33.  
                                                        
32  Gessler (2002) stated that “The terms for IPR cooperation are less that clear than with wording like “low cost licensing” or 
“cross-licensing”. But the practice in Europe at that time with state-owned national monopolies, telecoms R&D was tied to 
quasi-vertical integration so that  not much was patented, and patents were freely licensed among (related) suppliers and 
component producers.” 
33 Gessler (2002) also noted the political and diplomatic efforts involved in the dispute. He stated that “Qualcomm 
communicated their position to the U.S. government, which resulted in actions from the United States such as in the 
TransAtlantic Business Dialogues (TABD)33. Qualcomm’s contention was that the adoption of WCDMA as a global standard 
would create technical barriers to trade for U.S. industry, and that Ericsson’s IPR claims were part of such a strategy. Their 
lobbying with the U.S. government resulted, among other things, in a letter from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the 
European Commission, in which U.S. demands on free and fair trade were presented. The actions from the U.S. government 
were in part also triggered by an early decision by the European Commission to require European countries to license 
IMT-2000 bands to an ETSI standard (WCDMA). This was interpreted as a violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements, and interaction between the United States and Europe led to a reinterpretation of the agreements. As a result, the 
European Commission was careful to point out that it did not mandate the ETSI UMTS standards for all operators bidding for 
3G licenses in Europe. Instead they left the licensing procedures up to the different member states of the EU, and  29
A more recent example is between Qualcomm and Nokia. The two companies had been 
at odds since April 2007, when the previous licensing agreement between them expired. Nokia 
said it should pay a lower royalty rate than it had been because it controlled important 
technology with its own patents. 
Settling such disputes has been very costly in terms of both money and time. In the case 
of Qualcomm vs. Ericsson, it took the two companies three years to settle the patent lawsuit 
finally. As part of the settlement, Ericsson gains access to San Diego-based Qualcomm's 
mobile phone technology and agrees to buy its mobile phone infrastructure division for an 
undisclosed amount of money
34. The settlement between Qualcomm and Nokia was reached in 
July, 2008. Mark McKechnie, an industry analyst with American Technology Research, 
estimated that the settlement could mean as much as $400 million in royalties paid to 
Qualcomm next year based on a calculation of 2 percent royalty fee on the 100 million phones 
equipped with Qualcomm technology that it seemed likely to sell though a 5 percent royalty 
arrangement is more typical in the  industry. Meanwhile, the resolution could also save 
Qualcomm as much as $200 million a year in legal bills
35. 
Similar licensing disputes may occur with the commercialization of Chinese TD-SCDMA. 
This so-called indigenous Chinese standard has a substantial portion of foreign patents
36 which 
increase the difficulty of licensing fees negotiation given the IPR policies adopted by some 
incumbent companies such as Qualcomm. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
recommended that no standards requirements be put on the licensees.” 
34  See “Ericsson, Qualcomm Resolve Wireless Phone Dispute” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5553/is_/ai_n22392652. 
35  See “Qualcomm and Nokia Settle Patent Lawsuit”, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/24/technology/qualcomm.php. 
36 It is hard to estimate the number of patents in the TD-SCDMA. It varies widely in different reports, ranging from 7% to 
over 50% for China share in the total patents.  30
In the absence of an established licensing mechanism
37, an option for Chinese 
manufacturers and others to cope with blocking patents (e.g., system for code division 
multi-access communication) is to pursue alternative technologies to replace the blocking one. 
Both South Korea and China are currently making efforts to develop OFDM (orthogonal 
frequency-division multiplexing), MIMO (multiple input and multiple output) and other 
technologies, hoping they can be used to avoid the blocking patent. The aim is to break 
Qualcomm’s monopoly position in the CDMA-based standard competition era.   
Learning as the Basis for Future Standards Development 
The experience of developing TD-SCDMA, and its success or failure, will also help build 
up China’s know-how in negotiation and commercialization of standardization in general, 
which, in turn, will benefit further standard-setting activities such as 4G. This has also been an 
objective of Chinese policy in this area. 
It is not clear which strategy that China adopted secured the success in the negotiation in 
ITU. One view is that Chinese negotiators maneuvered by allying with the US and EU and 
leveraging its promising domestic market. This tactic might not be repeatable in the follow-on 
standard setting negotiations, since concrete alliances need to be established based on joint 
technology cooperation and common commercial interests.   
Also Chinese TD-SCDMA commercialization up to now remains unproven, although 
clearly lessons have been learned for future commercialization. One issue is the repeatedly 
postponed licensing which is sometimes attributed to the less than satisfactory testing 
performance of TD-SCDMA trial network to allow more time for the TD-SCDMA to improve 
                                                        
37  One of the criteria of entering TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance is the sharing of IPRs which is not accepted by the incumbent 
wholly-owned foreign companies.  31
its performance. This strategy of improving the success probability of a homegrown standard 
by facilitating its earlier deployment in the domestic market or naming it the national standard 
is a common practice in almost all of the countries involved in global standards setting. 
According to Gessler (2002)’s detailed description of the 2G and 3G standardization process in 
the United States and EU, it seems that though the United States claims to apply a “hands-off” 
approach in standards selection, the United States may have delayed the 2G licensing in order 
to give CDMA (which is sponsored mainly by an American company – Qualcomm) some time 
to improve its technical performance. In the 3G deployment, the European Commission overtly 
requires European countries to license IMT-2000 bands to an ETSI standard (WCDMA). 
Gandal, Salant and Waverman (2003) notes that “the reason for their favoring WCDMA is 
possibly due to the fact that it puts them on even footing with CDMA 2G equipment suppliers 
and operators whereas CDMA2000 would give the latter a competitive cost and time to market 
advantage”. 
The benefits of first deployment in the market are that, the first system deployed is 
expected to improve faster than the followers based on learning-by-doing (Arthur, 1989; 
Cowan, 1991; Bassanini and Dosi, 1998). Another benefit of first-mover strategy is gaining 
higher penetration in market expanding and leveraging network development
38 (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985) especially if there is no compatibility between different standard-based 
networks. In the case of wireless systems competition, incompatibilities can be offset by 
interconnection agreements between different standard network operators (Gandal, Salant and 
Waverman, 2003; Laffont and Tirole, 2000), but telecommunications operators still have to 
                                                        
38 Network effects refer to the phenomenon whereby a service/good becomes more valuable as more people use it, thereby 
encouraging ever-increasing numbers of adopters.  32
agree on interconnection fees based on customer base size and network performance and can 
maneuver on the terms of acceptance or extension of agreements. In the case of the 
interconnection where network effects do not play an important role, a first mover advantage 
can reflect Stackelberg leader-follower competition (Stackelberg,1934). 
Another element of benefit from the prospective success of TD-SCDMA is its ability to 
produce applications programs specific to the TD-SCDMA system. The network effect 
deriving from complementary products also helps tilt the market in favor of TD-SCDMA. 
Currently mobile TV based on a Chinese indigenous application program called CMMD is 
applied to TD-SCDMA standard
39. If more programs specific for TD-SCDMA could be 
developed TD-SCDMA could have a better chance to win the market.   
An important factor affecting the operators’ selection of standard is its potential of 
continual improvement where transmission data rate is the key performance indicator. All 
sponsors of the three main 3G standards (WCDMA, CDMA2000 and TD-SCDMA) have 
devoted themselves to continual evolution following the market deployment of their respective 
systems. The original transmission speed specified by ITU (i.e., 144 kbit/s for vehicular high 
speed; 384 kbit/s for medium speed; and 2048 kbit/s for indoor) is too low to realize 
multi-media data service function. More recent versions of the major standards
40 (including 
TD-SCDMA) can support up to 14 Mbit/s at which speed some multi-media application 
programs can be better applied.   
In the longer term, all these three major 3G standards are moving towards LTE (stands 
for Long Term Evolution) version, aiming to compete against an alternative wireless system 
                                                        
39  Another application applied to TD-SCDMA standard is video phone. 
40  The evolution version of WCDMA is HSDPA, HSUPA; CDMA2000 EV-DO, CDMA2000 EV-DV for CDMA2000; China 
also has developed its enhanced version of TD-SCDMA – HSDPA.  33
which is developed from IP-based technology – WiMAX
41. The evolution of TD-SCDMA to 
LTE version is supported not only by the current TD-SCDMA Industry Alliance but also, more 
important, by a key state R&D project named Future Technologies for Universal Radio 
Environment (FuTURE)
42.  
The FuTURE project was initiated in 2001. Its main objective was to develop beyond 
3G/4G systems. Meanwhile, it also aims to help TD-SCDMA smoothly evolve to a fourth 
generation technology. Liu et al. (2006) presented an evolution map from TD-SCDMA to 
future terrestrial universal radio environment (FuTURE) TDD in China. They suggest the 
evolution will occur in four phases: low chip rate (LCR), high-speed downlink/uplink packet 
access (HSxPA)/TD-SCDMA EV 1x, long-term evolution (LTE) TDD, and FuTURE beyond 
3G TDD. Currently HSxPA has already been commercialized and used by TD-SCDMA. The 
evolution to LTE version is on the way as a pilot demonstration network, which claims to meet 
the ITU’s IMT-Advanced (i.e., dubbed 4G) specifications (i.e., 100 Mbit/s for high mobility 
and 1 Gbit/s for low mobility), has already been successfully launched in Shanghai's 
Changning District at a cost of RMB 150million (about US$ 19.2 million)
43.  
Another lesson from the TD-SCDMA development is how to find partners for technology 
development. The breakup of cooperation between Datang Mobile and Siemens as well as the 
                                                        
41  WiMAX has emerged as one of the leading standards designed to deliver both fixed and mobile wireless broadband, backed 
by a consortium led by Intel, Motorola and others. Currently, it is supported by the IEEE, the global computing body, and ITU. 
This system is based on TCP/IP – the technology that underpins the internet. Technically it is called IEEE 802.16 standard and 
designed to deliver IP data traffic at multiple megabits per second over a range of several kilometers. As its designed speed is 
much higher than that of the original version of the three dedicated network-based systems (i.e., WCDMA, CDMA2000 and 
TD-SCDMA), WiMAX sponsors claim it a 4G system. However, in order to facilitate the commercialization and earlier market 
deployment, it applied to ITU for a 3G standard status and gained the approval on October 19th, 2007. At present, it is already 
being deployed by Sprint and Clearwire in the US and SK in Korea. 
42  It is a National High-Tech R&D Program labeled “863” FuTURE project. For details about China’s Science and Technology 
system , please see Whalley and Zhou (2007). 
43 China claims that this pilot network is the world's first 4G mobile communications trial system. Before that in September 
2006 Samsung Electronics claimed at the annual Samsung 4G Forum in Jeju Island that it had developed the world's first 
demonstration of 4G mobile technology whose data rates have reached 100Mbps on a vehicle moving at up to 60kms/hr, with 
cell-to-cell handover, and up to 1Gbps inside the exhibition area.  34
bankruptcy of Commit demonstrate the difficulty of finding appropriate partners. Maybe a 
result of the difficulty in partnering with western MNCs is that during the execution of 
FuTURE project cooperation is more likely found to be with South Korean and Japanese 
companies based on their common interests in lowering licensing fees. For example, a 
memorandum was signed by four standard setting organizations from China, Japan and South 
Korea in 2002 which specifically identified 4G as a focus cooperation area
44. 
A further element of potential benefit from TD-SCDMA is its potential evolution over 
time as a lower cost standard, and the learning from this experience for other possible 
technologies. Kennedy (2006) discusses WAPI (Wired Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure) as a new national technical standards strategy that could lead to conflict with the 
international community over standard-setting. Other related initiatives include product 
tracking and remote identification (RFID), digital audio-video coding and decoding (AVS), the 
formats of audio-video disc players (EVD), and digital home networking and next-generation 
internet protocols. Standards-setting for the high-technology industry in China is clearly a 
complex matter. At the same time, China’s standards strategy is part of the wider technology 
development strategy being followed. 
Standards as Part of the National Strategy of an “Innovative Economy” 
China’s activity in international standards setting has to be seen as part of China’s wider 
development policy. This is based on ever deeper integration into the global economy, 
continual product quality upgrading to underpin export growth, and reduced reliance on 
                                                        
44 On November 7th, 2002, four standard organizations in China, Japan and Korea (namely, CCSA, ARIB, TTC and TTA) 
signed a MoU for mutual cooperation in the growth and development of the information and telecommunication industries of 
the three countries. They agreed to mutually exchange views and information on the status of the industries and to contribute to 
the works of standard organizations of regional and global levels through cooperation (ITU, 2003). In mid 2004, South Korea, 
Japan and China were reported to be collaborating on 4G technology.  35
expensive foreign IPR. In part the source of these policies lie with China’s so-called 
“technology trap”. According to Kennedy (2006), despite progress on a number of dimensions 
of technological development (including a manned space program), China is still dealing with 
problems which are seen as frustrating indigenous technological progress. China’s patenting 
activity is seen as disappointing and Chinese products rarely incorporate indigenous 
intellectual property. In turn, China’s remarkable growth as a center of manufacturing and 
emergence as a significant exporter of high-technology goods still involves dependence on 
foreign technologies that has seemingly deepened following China’s accession to the WTO. 
China’s determination to escape from a “technology trap” is best reflected in The 
Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-term Program for Science and Technology 
Development 2006-2020 released in early 2006. Next generation of wireless broadband 
technology (e.g. 3G, beyond 3G/4G, etc.) is listed as one of the most important technology 
development projects – Mega Projects. In addition to the general targets of technology 
development such as patent accumulation and talent cultivation, 3G and other indigenous 
standards setting initiatives are expected to contribute to the establishment of 
vertically-integrated industry chains and support for enterprises instead of government research 
institutes is to play a dominant role in the indigenous innovation system
45. 
These strategies respond to China’s widely recognized weaknesses in domestic science 
and technology development, including low enterprise R&D and government research 
institutes with limited connections to industry. Given the increasingly aggressive IPR strategy 
adopted by western countries, China is seen as needing to shift from a high degree of 
dependence on foreign technology to the development of indigenous technology. 
Western scholars usually argue that these weaknesses are fundamentally attributed to 
China’s weak IPRs regime (e.g., Kennedy, 2006). Though recently a small but growing number 
                                                        
45  There is no official document release for 3G development strategy, but one for another indigenous Chinese standard RFID 
was released in 2006 titled China RFID Technology Policy White Paper. These two points were stated clearly in that official 
document.  36
of papers have challenged the validity of current patent systems and advocate change (e.g., 
Farrell and Shapiro, 2008), the Chinese government seems to prefer to gradually strengthen the 
existing regime. The implementation of this involves other related areas such as antitrust law 
and venture capital market development. 
A point of debate between indigenous standard support and new technology development 
is that with increasing returns due to network effects or learning-by-doing, the market might 
adopt an inferior technology (Arthur, 1989; Cowan, 1991; Shy, 2001; David, 1985; etc.). Some 
counter arguments have been made. For example, Cowan (1991) emphasized that it was 
difficult to identify the best technology for those with uncertain merits. Bassanini and Dosi 
(1998) proposed that in a market with rapid technological change, no predictions can be made 
by simply looking at theoretical considerations alone. Thus with high uncertainty of outcomes 
in this industry, Chinese government support for TD-SCDMA should perhaps remain as 
cautious and gradual
46. 
Therefore, China’s strategy for extensive government involvement in standards setting 
and its commercialization, as in the case of TD-SCDMA, thus need to also be seen relative to 
these constraints and the broader objectives of development policy. But whether effective 
commercialization can be achieved at reasonable cost, and how easy further international 
negotiation will be remains unproven. At the end of the day TD-SCDMA may remain for a 
whole as largely a standard for the domestic Chinese market on which future development can 
build, and it can evolve into a 4G standard. The saving in foreign license fees may still justify 
the financial investment in the standard, and if this is so this approach may be the one used 
with future standards initiatives. 
 
 
                                                        
46 As a matter of fact, Chinese government support to TD-SCDMA during its commercialization has been cautious and 
gradual, which is partly reflected in the planned licensing covering three standards instead of one for TD-SCDMA.  37
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we discuss Chinese experience with both international negotiation of 3G 
standard (TD-SCDMA) and its subsequent commercialization. Our discussion is in the context 
of China’s wider development strategy based on quality upgrading, and achieving an 
innovative economy. Standards setting in telecom used to be an area reserved for developed 
countries. Chinese entry into this field has aroused great interests as well as doubts. In view of 
the highly intensive R&D investment required for standard development and deployment, 
together with the complicated negotiation in global standards competition, it seems to be 
ambitious for China to develop the TD-SCDMA initiative. And although Chinese efforts have 
resulted in some progress, it is still uncertain how successful the TD-SCDMA strategy will be 
and by how much China can benefit. But even if its deployment is mainly in the Chinese 
market, the savings in foreign license fees may justify the effort. 
This paper first describes briefly the general wireless standardization process and the 
main Chinese and international organizations involved in 3G standards negotiation. It then 
provides background to Chinese major stakeholders in 3G standardization together with 
documentation of China’s 3G experience of attempts to commercialize. This raises several 
issues concerning both the proposal process and commercialization as well as its prospective 
evolution to 4G and an alternative technology – WiMAX.   
Due to the complex and evolving nature of wireless technology, it is hard to tell which 
standard will prove stronger in the long term. Wireless technology experts claim that each have 
their own advantages which can also be integrated together (Gessler, 2002). At later stages of 
3G harmonization under ITU, the concept of family technology arose with multi radio access  38
technologies grouped together providing interconnection between them to ensure seamless 
roaming. The key blocking factor for technology integration is intellectual property. With 
learning by doing/using, China now has the possibility to take part in future market 
developments. But a lot of detail will determine success or failure of standard setting initiatives, 
such as R&D cooperation, financing mechanisms, IPR negotiation and others. The emergence 
of a WiMAX-based standard will likely have substantial impact on the value of the 
TD-SCDMA standard as well as other wireless technologies.   
In conclusion, wireless standard competition is dynamic and hard to predict in outcome, 
and the technologies involved are extremely complex. What China has done in the 3G area 
may prove to be pragmatic and well-founded, but how much the intervention will cost in the 
long term and with what return is unclear. As the nature of high technology is high-risk and 
high-uncertainty, it is hard to predict whether this Chinese homegrown 3G standard will 
succeed or not, or how big a market share it can gain. However, even it fails to gain a 
significant international market share, the domestic market deployment may cover its R&D 
investment and infrastructure deployment. Its impact on national innovative capacity 
accumulation and international competitiveness can also still be substantial from a long-term 
point of view as long as China holds to its current development strategy. 
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  Appendix  A   TD-SCDMA  Industry  Alliance Members and Their Major Specialization 
Specialized 
Areas 
Company Brief  Description 
T3G Technology Co. Ltd  State-enterprise. 
Incorporated in Jan 2003 
A joint venture of Philips, Datang Mobile, Samsung and Motorola. T3G’s founding 
partners are Philips, Datang Mobile, Samsung, Motorola joined and became a new 
investor in Jan 2005. 
Commit Inc.  State enterprise. 
Established in February 2002.   
Investors consisting of 17 well-known enterprises such as China Potevio Corporation, 
China Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT), Texas Instruments 
(China), Nokia (China) Investment Co. Limited, LG Electronics, Inc., and Hyper Market 
International Limited and etc. 
China Academy of 
Telecommunications 
Technology / Datang 
Telecom Technology and 
Industry Group 
State enterprise. 
Its subsidiary -- China mobile, established in 2002, is the major sponsor of TD-SCDMA
Partnering with Nortel, Alcatel, etc. 
Product coverage: chipset, terminal, base station, etc. 
Spreadtrum 
Communications 
Established in 2001 by 17 overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, headquartered in Silicon 





Funded mainly by Chongqing Post and Telecom University, partly from government. 
 
Comlent  TD-SCDMA RF IC chip, base band chip.   
Chipset 
solution 
RDA Microelectronics  founded in 2004 in Shanghai with funding from the world's premier Private Equity 
Funds  
Koretide Corporation  Established in June of 2000,   




A public high-tech enterprise listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2000 
Hisense Group  Established in 1994 
SHANGHAI DBTEL 
Industry CO. Ltd 
Established in 1993, subsidiary of Taiwan DBTEL group 
UTStarcom  headquartered in the Silicon Valley in US with more than 10 R&D centers in the US, 
China, India, Korea and Canada. 






(Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 
a foreign-funded IT enterprise established in Shanghai as early as 1991  40
TCL Mobile 
Communication Co., Ltd 
set up in 1999 
Legend (Beijing) Ltd.   
Holley Group  a privately owned incorporation 
Yulong    
Ningbo BIRD Co., Ltd  A Chinese enterprise 
Shanghai Simcom  The first research and development subsidiary company of SIM Technology Group, a 
listed company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Longcheer Group   
Zhongshan Tongyu   
Xi'an Haitian Antenna 
Technologies Co., Ltd. 
a high-tech stock enterprise 
Andrew Foreign  company 
Antenna 
MOBI  
Huawei Technologies Ltd.  Partnering  with  Siemens  Communications Group, TD Tech Ltd. was formally 
established on March 18, 2005 in Beijing. 
ZTE  Corporation  Founded in 1985, China's largest listed telecommunications manufacturer and 
wireless solutions provider. 
Potevio Corporation  state enterprise   
founded in 1980 , originally called China Posts and Telecommunications Industry 
Corporation 
Alcatel Shanghai Bell  the first foreign invested company with a share in China’s telecommunications industry
Guangzhou New Postcom 




Descendant of Wuhan Research Institute of Post and Telecommunications 
Comba Telecom Systems  Comba listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2003 
ACE Achieve Group  A Chinese high-tech enterprise 
Shenzhen CFC Network 
Technology Co., Ltd. 





Corporation No 14 Institute 
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation is a State Key Enterprise. 
Beijing Zhong Chuang 
Telecom Test Co., Ltd. 
(ZCTT) 
A Chinese high-tech enterprise, established in 1995 and went public in 2003   
Hubei Zhongyou 
Technology Industry & 
Commerce Co. ,Ltd. 









Corporation No 41 Institute 
China Electronics Technology Group Corporation is a State Key Enterprise. 
Notes: State Key Enterprises are directly under the leadership of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) 
Sources: Yihui Lu (2007), Chinese Strategy for Developing Indigenous Standards based on the Commercialization Experience of 
Chinese Indigenous 3G standard, ITIS Industry Observation (in Chinese) and companies’ websites.   






TD Tech Potevio 
New 
Postcom
Network construction progress 
Beijing 
√        
More than 2000 base stations. ZTE 
occupies all.   
Shanghai   √     √  More than 2000 base stations. 
Guangzhou 
  √     √ 
2116 base stations by November 
2007, covering 1153 km2 
Shenzhen  √    √      About 2000 base stations. 
Tianjin 
√     √   
Completed by October 2007. ZTE 
and Potevio share the market.   
Shenyang  √    √     
Qinhuangdao 
√     √   
Completed by August 2007. ZTE 




√    √    
About 150 base stations completed 
by September 2007, shared by 




  √  √    
104 base stations in Stage 1; 100 
base stations in Stage 2 (finished 
92%). tender for Stage 2: 0.82 




√  √      
150 base stations in Stage 1; 300 
base stations in Stage 2. Tender for 
Stage 2 is 0.8 billion RMB. ZTE 
and Datang ASB: 50% to 50%.   
Source: Liu, Jing (2008) “TD-SCDMA in 10 Cities: Facing Network Test”, China Electronics News.   
Available online <http://www.cena.com.cn/Article/tongxin/TDzhuanti/2008-03-14/20080314135803_6810.shtml>  42
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